



**Employing Information Operations at the Marine  
Expeditionary Unit Level in the Sixth Fleet Area of  
Responsibility**

**A Monograph  
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**First Term AY 00-01**

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
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
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Title of Monograph: Employing Information Operations at the Marine Expeditionary Unit Level in the Sixth Fleet Area of Responsibility

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Accepted this 15th Day of December 2000

## ABSTRACT

EMPLOYING INFORMATION OPERATIONS AT THE MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT LEVEL IN THE SIXTH FLEET AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY by Major Mike Brown, USMC, 55 pages.

Information operations (IO) are defined as actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. Based upon this definition, at the tactical level, the focus of IO is on affecting an adversary's information and information systems related to command and control, intelligence, logistics, maneuver, and firepower as they relate to the conduct of military operations while protecting our own capabilities. Military activities at the tactical level will often bear a resemblance to traditional operations with the IO dimension being the effect these activities have at the operational level.

The significance of this IO capability for a Marine Air-Ground Task Force (MAGTF) commander, specifically within the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU(SOC)), is important because it provides that commander with another way of effecting an opponent through direct or indirect means. Currently the Marine Corps does not possess the capability to perform IO at the MEU(SOC) level. The purpose of this monograph is to explore how the Marine Corps intends to employ offensive IO within the Sixth Fleet area of responsibility (AOR).

The United States Marine Corps has maintained an active presence within the Sixth Fleet's AOR (Mediterranean Sea) since the end of the second World War. The MEU(SOC) is uniquely task organized, equipped, and trained to meet complex missions ranging from Noncombatant Evacuation Operations to amphibious raids. These missions would be enhanced once the Marine Corps develops the capability to employ IO at the MEU(SOC) level.

The Marine Corps intends to develop this IO force for use within each of the MAGTFs (MEF, MEB, and MEU). The projected capabilities of this IO team would be to conduct limited offensive and defensive IO for the MEU commander. This IO force would also have the ability, albeit limited in scope and scale, to initiate an IO campaign for the MEU based on a JTF commander's guidance until a larger IO force assumed that JTF mission.

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## CHAPTER ONE

### INTRODUCTION

D+1. The company commander was ready to launch a small boat raid with his Sparrow Hawk force when he received word from the MEU S-3 that he will be taking an additional seven Marines on his raid. The company commander asked who these Marines were and what their mission was. He was instructed to drop them off at the beach-landing site (BLS) and they would rendezvous with him there before his force was ready for extraction - that was the extent to which he would know their mission. Just then a 1<sup>st</sup> Lieutenant arrives with six other lightly armed Marines. They are carrying small arms, radio equipment, and several laptop computers. Once they have been inserted ashore, they leave the raid force and travel quickly to a nearby rail-line. Once there they use clandestine means to hack into the rail network computer and reroute two trains on separate tracks to join on the same track and run into one another. Once these commands are given to the railway's mainframe computer, this team of Marines withdraws to the BLS to await their extraction. Less than twenty-four hours later, a train carrying an illegal shipment of military equipment slams into an oncoming coal train and is destroyed. Local officials launch an investigation to determine how this could happen. One month later, the investigation concludes and an announcement in their nation's media declares that a computer error was the cause of the crash. No evidence ever exists to implicate the Marines or the U. S. government.<sup>1</sup>

Information Operations are "actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems."<sup>2</sup> Based upon this definition, at the tactical level, the focus of IO is on affecting our adversary's information and

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<sup>1</sup> Note: This fictional vignette illustrates the intended capability that an IO force would be capable of performing within the MEU(SOC).

<sup>2</sup> The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Staff, 1998), I-3.

information systems as they relate to command and control, intelligence, logistics, maneuver, force protection, and fires in the conduct of military operations while protecting our own capabilities. Military activities at the tactical level will often appear similar to traditional operations with the IO dimension being the effect these activities have at the operational level. The significance of this IO capability for a MAGTF<sup>3</sup> commander, specifically within the Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) (MEU (SOC)), is important because it provides that commander with another way of affecting an opponent through direct or indirect means (as described in the fictional vignette at the start of this chapter).

The U. S. Navy and Marine Corps are the only services not to have a doctrinal definition of IO. The only official Marine Corps document that addressed IO was a Concept Paper written by LtGen John Rhodes, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command in 1998.<sup>4</sup> Once the Marine Corps establishes this doctrinal definition

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<sup>3</sup> The MAGTF is the Marine Corps' principle organization for the conduct of all missions across the range of military operations. MAGTFs are balanced, combined-arms forces with organic ground, aviation, and sustainment elements. They are flexible, task-organized forces that can respond rapidly to a contingency anywhere in the world and are able to conduct a variety of missions. Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 5-12D, *Organization of Marine Corps Forces*, (Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1998), 2-1.

<sup>4</sup> LtGen J. E. Rhodes, "A Concept for Information Operations," 15 May, 1998.

it will be necessary to organize, train and equip a force capable of conducting IO for the MAGTF. Therefore, the question that this issue raises is whether the United States Marine Corps can employ offensive IO at the MEU(SOC)<sup>5</sup> level. In order to determine the applicability of this intended force, the Sixth Fleet area of responsibility (AOR) will serve as a model for its intended employment. The selection of the Sixth Fleet AOR as an area of interest for this paper was made due to the Marine Corps' increasing role within the European Command (EUCOM) theater as demonstrated through recent involvement in several Joint Task Forces (JTF) that the MEU has provided support to.

## BACKGROUND

In order to understand how the Marine Corps intends to utilize offensive IO, it is necessary to compare existing IO doctrine with that used by our sister services and the joint definition.

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<sup>5</sup> The Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable (MEU(SOC)) is the standard forward-deployed Marine expeditionary organization. The MEU(SOC) can be thought of both as a self-contained operating force capable of missions of limited scope and duration and as a forward deployed extension of the Marine Expeditionary Force. MEUs routinely receive special training before deploying that results in their being designated as "Special Operations Capable." To receive the certification, the MEU undergoes an intensive 26-week, standardized predeployment training program that includes an exercise and a final evaluation. MCRP 5-12D, 2-4.



<b>Department of Defense Definition (DODD S-3600.1)</b>	"Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems." <sup>6</sup>
<b>Joint Definition (Joint Publication 3-13)</b>	"Information operations (IO) involve actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. They apply across all phases of an operation, the range of military operations, and at every level of war. They are a critical factor in the Joint Force Commander's (JFC's) capability for decisive joint operations." <sup>7</sup>
<b>United States Army Definition (Field Manual 100-6)</b>	"Continuous military operations within the military information environment that enable, enhance, and protect the friendly force's ability to collect, process, and act on information to achieve an advantage across the full range of military operations; information operations include interacting with the global information environment and exploiting or denying an adversary's information and decision capabilities." <sup>8</sup>
<b>United States Air Force Definition (AFDD 2-5)</b>	1. "Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information." 2. "Those actions taken to gain, exploit, defend or attack information and information systems and include both information in warfare and information warfare." (DRAFT) <sup>9</sup>
<b>United States Navy Concept</b>	"Information operations (IO) involve actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. They apply across all phases of an operation, the range of military operations, and at every level of war. They are a critical factor in the Joint Force Commander's capability to achieve and sustain the level of information superiority required for decisive joint operations." <sup>10</sup>
<b>United States Marine Corps Concept</b>	"Information operations involve actions taken to affect adversary information and

<sup>6</sup> Department of Defense Directive S-3600.1, Definition of Information Operations [definition on-line]; available from <http://www.sans.org/newlook/resources/glossary>; Internet; accessed 17 August 2000.

<sup>7</sup> The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13, *Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: The Joint Staff, 1998), I-3.

<sup>8</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-6, *Information Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Army, 1996), Glossary-7.

<sup>9</sup> Headquarters, Air Force Doctrine Center, Air Force Doctrine Document 2-5, *Information Operations (DRAFT)*, (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: United States Air Force, 2000) 52.

<sup>10</sup> Ms. Ingrid Rader. Interview by author 24 September 2000, Kansas. Phone interview. U. S. Navy's Fleet Information Warfare Center (FIWC), Little Creek, Virginia.

	information systems while defending our own. Aimed to influence decision makers, information operations are applicable across the spectrum of civil-military operations - from peace to crisis to conflict - and at all levels of war." <sup>11</sup>
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In an attempt to define IO doctrine for the Corps, the current Assistant Commandant of Plans, Policy and Operations (PP&O), LtGen Emil "Buck" Bedard, directed his staff in August 2000 to develop the doctrinal definition of IO based on the Concept Paper written by LtGen John Rhodes. This tasking is in conjunction with the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Information Superiority Panel - Information Operations Task Force (IOTF) request for information on Marine Corps IO forces and capabilities.<sup>12</sup> This paper identifies a major point of consideration on whether or not Marine Corps IO forces and capabilities are adequately structured and prepared "with respect to the ability to execute the current NMS at a low-to-moderate level of risk?" Further, it identifies the need to generate, equip, and train this force. In addition, it asks, "does this structure meet combatant force requirements?" in terms of how the Corps intends to develop it's doctrine, policy and strategic implementation of this type force. A key

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<sup>11</sup> LtGen John E. Rhodes, "A Concept for Information Operations" 15 May 1998.

<sup>12</sup> United States Marine Corps, Plans, Policies and Operations, Information Paper, Quadrennial Defense Review Information Superiority

assumption, as a result of this research, is that the Marine Corps (PP&O) will have a doctrinal definition of IO before the start of the QDR.

## IO IN SUPPORT OF MARINE CORPS DOCTRINE

Maneuver warfare is a "warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion through a variety of rapid, focused, and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope."<sup>13</sup> From this doctrinal framework, the Marine Corps developed Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS). OMFTS is the ability of the naval forces, at the operational level, to exploit enemy weaknesses in order to deliver a decisive blow. Therefore, it is directed against an enemy's center of gravity - "something that is essential to the enemy's ability to effectively continue the struggle."<sup>14</sup> At the tactical level, OMFTS translates to Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM). STOM relies on surprise, deception and ambiguity to create exploitable gaps in the enemy's dispositions.<sup>15</sup> The tenets of STOM

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Panel - Information Operations Task Force Response, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Marine Corps, 2000), 1.

<sup>13</sup> Headquarters, United States Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, *Warfighting*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Marine Corps, 1996), 73.

<sup>14</sup> Marine Corps Combat Development Command, *United States Marine Corps Warfighting Concepts for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century*, (Quantico, VA: United States Marine Corps), I-9.

<sup>15</sup> Anonymous, "An Implementation Concept for Operational Maneuver from the Sea," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (Quantico, VA: Marine Corps Association, 1997), A1-A11.

(deception, surprise, and ambiguity) are key links for the application of offensive IO within the MEU due to their ability to affect an adversary's decision-making, and information systems as they relate to C<sup>2</sup>, intelligence, and other information-based processes directly relating to the conduct of military operations.

The Marine Corps intends to develop this IO force for use within each of the MAGTFs (MEF, MEB, and MEU). The planned use at the MEU level would result in an IO team being identified prior to the deployment of a MEU, but this entire team may not actually sail with that MEU. Instead, elements of that IO team would be prepared to deploy on short notice once requested by the MEU commander in order to support a specific contingency. The projected capabilities of this IO team would be to conduct limited offensive and defensive IO for the MEU commander. This IO force would also have the ability, albeit limited in scope and scale, to initiate an IO campaign for the MEU based on a JTF commander's guidance until a larger IO force assumed that JTF mission. This projected capability, discussed in detail in Chapter 3, enables the MEU to assimilate more quickly into a JTF headquarters and provide immediate IO support.

## LIMITATIONS

This paper, while remaining unclassified, is an effort to reveal as much as possible about the Marine Corps' current and projected capabilities in the realm of IO. However, in the process of conducting the research for this monograph, there are many aspects of IO that remain classified. By the conclusion of this paper, the reader will be left with an appreciation for these capabilities, yet many issues will not have been articulated due to their compartmentalization and classification.

## CHAPTER TWO

*"If we cannot articulate how Marine Corps forces can contribute to such a theater-level IO campaign, then we risk becoming marginalized in a narrow segment of the conflict as joint planners look to other forces that can articulate their relevance."*<sup>16</sup>

### BACKGROUND

The Marine Corps' presence in the Mediterranean Sea began at the conclusion of World War II. At that time, this program was the "Marine Afloat" program.<sup>17</sup> Following the end of the Vietnam War, the Marine afloat program became more regular and formalized through the name Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) and the establishment of a supporting headquarters.<sup>18</sup> In the late 1970s, during the Carter administration, "the compact MAUs aboard their ARGs [Amphibious Ready Groups] quickly became the only U.S. military units that could begin to rapidly respond to a crises around the world."<sup>19</sup> In 1987 the MAUs were redesignated Marine Expeditionary Units by the 29<sup>th</sup> Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Alfred M. Gray, because of his belief that the word "expeditionary" captured the essence

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<sup>16</sup> Major Norman C. Davis, USMC, "The Marine Corps and Information Operations," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (Quantico: Marine Corps Association, 1997), 20.

<sup>17</sup> Allen R. Millett, *Semper Fidelis, The History of the United States Marine Corps*, (New York: Macmillan, Inc.), 616-618.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid*, 624-635.

<sup>19</sup> Tom Clancy, *Marine: A Guided Tour of a Marine Expeditionary Unit*, (New York: Berkley Books, 1996), 210.

of the Marine Corps more boldly. Additionally he added the (SOC) program designation to the MEU as a formal part of their pre-deployment training, certification, and responsibility. During his tenure as commandant, the certification process needed to gain the (SOC) designation gained importance and significance.

Although MAGTFs are task organized, each MAGTF, regardless of its size or mission, has the same general structure. Every MAGTF has four core elements: a command element (CE), a ground combat element (GCE), an aviation combat element (ACE), and a combat service support element (CSSE). The CE is the MAGTF's headquarters. It is task organized to provide C<sup>2</sup> capabilities for planning, direction, and execution of all operations. The GCE is task organized to conduct ground operations in support of the MAGTF's mission. It is normally formed around an infantry organization reinforced with artillery, reconnaissance, armor, and engineer forces. The ACE is task organized to support the MAGTF mission by performing all or some of the six functions of Marine aviation (Offensive Air Support, Antiair warfare, Assault Support, Air Reconnaissance, Electronic warfare, Control of aircraft & missiles). The ACE is normally built around an aviation organization that is augmented with appropriate air command

and control, combat, combat support, and CSS units. The CSSE is task organized to provide the full range of CSS functions and capabilities (Supply, Maintenance, Transportation, Deliberate engineering, Services, and Health Services) needed to support the continued readiness and sustainability of the MAGTF as a whole.<sup>20</sup>

The Marine Corps has four types of MAGTFs. The largest of these is the Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF). The MEF consists of at least one Division, Marine Air Wing, and Force Service Support Group. Based on the mission, this organization can expand to include all four Divisions, Wings, and Service Support Groups within the entire Marine Corps. The next largest MAGTF is the Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). The MEB typically consists of a Regimental Landing Team, an aviation Group, and a Brigade Service Support Group (BSSG). Next is the MEU. This organization will be detailed later on in this chapter. Lastly, the Special Purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF) is task organized for a specific mission (e.g., Operation PRAYING MANTIS - the 1988 Iranian oil platform seizure in the Persian Gulf). The size of the SPMAGTF is dependent on its mission.

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<sup>20</sup> Marine Corps Reference Publication (MCRP) 5-12D, *Organization of Marine Corps Forces*, (Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1998), 2-1 - 2-2.



## THE MARINE EXPEDITIONARY UNIT (SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABLE)

A MEU(SOC) is a self-contained MAGTF. Three MEUs support the Sixth Fleet AOR on a six-month rotational basis. These are the 22<sup>nd</sup>, 24<sup>th</sup>, and 26<sup>th</sup> MEUs. Their headquarters is located within the II Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF), Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. Each MEU, commanded by a colonel, contains approximately 2,200 Marines. Once embarked on Navy shipping they form an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) typically comprised of three ships.<sup>21</sup> These ships collectively form an amphibious squadron (PHIBRON). The PHIBRON is commanded by a Navy captain, and is otherwise known as a Commodore due to his billet. A PHIBRON staff maintains C<sup>2</sup> over the ARG in support of the Commodore. The Commodore and the MEU Commander are co-equals for planning.

The MEU's CE is a company sized unit capable of providing command, control and communications (C<sup>3</sup>) for the entire MEU(SOC). The CE is the likely intended location for the Corps' IO force once deployed to the MEU (for task organizational purposes). This IO force needs to be assigned to either the Intelligence section (S-2) or the

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<sup>21</sup> The ARG is typically comprised of three ships; a Landing Helicopter Dockships (LHD), a Landing Ship Dock (LSD), and a Landing Platform Dock (LPD).

Operations section (S-3), within the CE, for accountability and reporting procedures (reference Appendix A).

The GCE is a reinforced infantry battalion (approximately 1,200 Marines/Sailors), otherwise known as a Battalion Landing Team (BLT) due to the unique attachments provided to its commander. Commanded by a lieutenant colonel, specialized attachments provided by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Division include an artillery battery, reconnaissance platoon, combat engineer platoon, Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) platoon, assault amphibian platoon, and tank platoon.

The ACE, commanded by a lieutenant colonel, is composed of a composite squadron of rotor-wing and fixed-wing aircraft provided by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Marine Aircraft Wing. These aircraft are the CH-46 (intended to be replaced by the MV-22 tiltrotor aircraft), CH-53, UH-1N Iriquois, AH-1W Cobra, and the AV-8B Harrier.

The CSSE is a company-sized unit, commanded by a lieutenant colonel, designed to provide sustainment and support to the MEU, otherwise known as a MEU Service Support Group (MSSG). It is comprised of eight platoons covering the following areas; supply, engineering,

transportation, maintenance, and medical services.<sup>22</sup> The 2nd Force Service Support Group provides these assets to the MSSG.

A key feature that the MEU(SOC) provides are the unique missions it is capable of performing and the compressed time in which it can plan to perform them. These missions<sup>23</sup>, evaluated during a comprehensive evaluation before deployment in order to gain the (SOC) qualification, are:

- Amphibious Raid (Boat, Helicopter, and Mechanized).
- Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation (NEO). Operations requested by the Department of State and directed by the National Command Authority (NCA) whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens or to the United States.
- Security Operations (Area and Physical Security to Embassy or Consulate-type Facility).
- Tactical Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP).
- Direct Action Missions (Destruction or Recovery Operations).
- Humanitarian/Civic Assistance.
- Clandestine Reconnaissance and Surveillance.
- Long Range Raid (Requiring Forward Arming and Refueling Point (FARP) Operations).
- Mass Casualty.
- Airfield Seizure Operations.

<sup>22</sup> Tom Clancy, *Marine: A Guided Tour of a Marine Expeditionary Unit*, (New York, Berkley, 1996), 216.

<sup>23</sup> Headquarters United States Marine Corps, *Marine Corps Order (MCO) 3502.3*, (Washington D.C.: Headquarters Marine Corps, 1995).

- Naval Platform Raid.
- Gas and Oil Platform (GOPLAT) seizure.
- Maritime Interdiction Operation (MIO).
- In-Extremis Hostage Recovery.
- Additional missions and capabilities as required by the Commander Marine Forces (COMMARFOR) or Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) Commander.

The MEU, in order to gain its (SOC) qualification<sup>24</sup>, must be capable of performing these missions within six hours of notification. The procedure that enables this rapid planning is an extension of the Marine Corps Planning Process (MCP) known as the Rapid Response Planning Process (R2P2). This planning process, employed in a time compressed planning sequence, is designed to use standardized crisis action procedures, concurrent/parallel/detailed planning actions, standardized confirmation briefs (in lieu of written operations orders), readiness checklists, drills, and rehearsals. Traditionally, the first one and a half hours of the six-hour timeline are spent on the R2P2's first ten planning steps which is referred to as the crisis action team (CAT) procedures. Another hour and a half devoted to developing the detailed plans. The confirmation brief commences at the three-hour mark and normally concludes by the fourth

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<sup>24</sup> The Special Operations Training Group (SOTG) from the MEF Headquarters conducts this exercise with evaluation provided by the

hour. Finally, step 14 (Commander and Staff supervision) takes up the final two hours where the subordinate unit commanders brief their troops, review readiness checklists, conduct drills and rehearsals.<sup>25</sup>

Upon completion of the evaluation by the MEF Training and Simulation section (G-7), and given their (SOC) certification by the MEF Commander, the MEU is ready to conduct their six-month deployment to the Mediterranean Sea, under the operational control (OPCON) of the U. S. Navy's Sixth Fleet.

#### THE U. S. NAVY'S SIXTH FLEET

The U. S. Navy's Sixth Fleet, headquartered on the command ship USS LaSalle (Naples, Italy), consists of approximately forty ships, one hundred seventy-five aircraft, and twenty-one thousand personnel. The command's geographic area of responsibility ranges from Norway down the western coast of Africa to Capetown, and eastward through Europe and the Mediterranean to Israel. The Sixth Fleet is the major operational component of Naval Forces Europe (NAVFOREUR). The commander of the Sixth Fleet has both U. S. national and NATO responsibilities. He reports

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MEF's G-7. The SOCEX is a two-week evaluation by the SOTG to determine the MEU's capabilities of conducting concurrent missions.

<sup>25</sup> Expeditionary Warfare Training Group, *MEU(SOC) Workshop Handbook*, (Virginia: Marine Forces Atlantic, 1997), 5.

to the Commander-in-Chief (CINC), U. S. Naval Forces, Europe (CinCUSNavEur) in the U. S. chain of command and to CinCSouth when the Sixth Fleet operates as part of NATO as Strike Forces South (StrikForSouth). The CINC NAVFOREUR, based in London, is responsible for U. S. naval operations in the European area and holds the NATO position of CINC Allied Forces Southern Europe, responsible to the NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe. The CINC NAVFOREUR does not have administrative responsibilities for support of U. S. naval forces in Europe, which are under the cognizance of CINC Atlantic Fleet located at Norfolk, Virginia (reference Appendix B).<sup>26</sup>

#### EMPLOYMENT WITHIN THE SIXTH FLEET AOR

The MEU, once it arrives in Rota, Spain, officially becomes OPCON to the Sixth Fleet from the Second Fleet (Norfolk, Virginia). In this capacity, it conducts numerous bilateral training exercises with European nations, and is ready to conduct operations at the discretion of the Sixth Fleet commander or the CinCAFSouth/CinCEUCOM. Under its NATO auspices, the MEU acts as the Strategic Reserve for the Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH).

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<sup>26</sup> U. S. Naval Forces Europe, *Command Organization* [Home Page on-line] (London, U. K.: accessed 04 October 2000); available from <http://www.naveur.navy.mil>; Internet.

A recent example of NATO involvement is that of the Marines from the 26<sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC) who were, "tasked with implementing the terms of the Military Technical Agreement signed by the leaders of the Serbian Armed Forces and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The MEU operated in a very large sector that contained an abundance of Serbian, Albanian, and ethnically mixed villages and towns... The mission was difficult and often confusing. Violence between Albanians and Serbs was widespread, and Marines found themselves in the middle of dangerous and potentially explosive situations."<sup>27</sup> The unique relevance of the MEU in this geographic environment is the rapid deployment capability it provides the CINC. As the Kosovo lesson taught NATO planners, the MEU would typically be among the first of the U. S. forces employed. "This could occur prior to the OPLAN or SOR [statement of requirements] even being approved. Given its versatility, elements of the MEU may be involved in many parallel operations simultaneously. This past spring [1999] during the Kosovo Air Campaign, 26<sup>th</sup> MEU [(SOC)] was afloat in the Adriatic Sea with AV-8Bs executing strike missions, the tactical recovery of aircraft and personnel package on alert, and troops ashore

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<sup>27</sup> Capt. Paul C. Merida, USMC, "The Strategic Corporal in Kosovo," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (February 2000): 46. Note: Capt. Merida was

in Albania conducting humanitarian assistance operations. Following the cease-fire, the MEU backloaded its elements that were ashore in Albania and moved around to northeastern Greece to land, move up through Macedonia, and enter Kosovo as part of the enabling force for KFOR. These actions were tied to three separate OPLANs, each with their own separate component commander and rules of engagement. Flexibility is essential in such an environment."<sup>28</sup> These two examples clearly represent the current use of the MEUs in the Sixth Fleet's AOR with respect to NATO involvement.

The MEU traditionally conducts five to six U. S. led bi-lateral training exercises for 'nation-building' purposes. These exercises are as follows:

- ALEXANDER THE GREAT - conducted in Greece, this exercise involves a force-on-force engagement between the ARG/MEU against the Greek Navy, Army, and Air Force. This followed by several days of bilateral training between these two units.
- SPANISH PHIBLEX (Amphibious Landing Exercise) - conducted along the southeastern coast of Spain, this exercise involves an opposed landing by the MEU against the Spanish Royal Marines. This portion of the exercise typically last two-three days, and concludes with two days of bilateral training and two-three days of MEU-specific training ashore utilizing the host nations training/live-fire areas.
- TUNISIAN PHIBLEX - conducted off the coast of Bizerte, Tunisia, this five-day exercise involves a two-day force-on-force between the MEU and the

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deployed in support of KFOR with 3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion, 8<sup>th</sup> Marines at the time he wrote this article.

<sup>28</sup> Maj. Patrick M. Delatta, USMC, "The Future of the MEU in NATO Operations," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (March, 2000): 70-71.



Tunisian Naval Infantry. Following this force-on-force there are three days of bilateral training between these units.

- ISRAEL - conducted in two locations in Israel, this exercise allows every component of the MEU (ACE, GCE, CSSE) to off-load and conduct unit training on Israeli Defense Force live-fire training areas. This exercise typically last ten-fourteen days.
- DISPLAY DETERMINATION - conducted in Turkey, this exercise involves a three-four day force-on-force between the ARG/MEU and the Turkish Army, Navy and Air Force. Following the force-on-force, these two opposing units join for three-four days of bilateral training (live fire and non-live fire).
- CAMP DE CANJUERS - a training site in central France, this location offers the MEU to conduct training ranging from tank gunnery to engineering operations. Marines and Sailors typically use this vast training area to enhance live fire skills and MOUT [Military Operations in Urban Terrain] techniques.

Based on this exercise/operations timeline, during a six-month deployment, it is therefore vital that the MEU have an organic capability to conduct IO. At the very minimum, the MEU must have the ability to request this type asset when the MEU commander feels that there is a requirement to have it. Admiral James O. Ellis criticized the use of IO by his own staff, JTF Noble Anvil, during the Kosovo air campaign. His underlying point from his "A View from the Top" PowerPoint presentation was that IO has "incredible potential...must become our asymmetric 'point of main effort'...but not yet understood by war fighters...and classified beyond their access." Had the 26<sup>th</sup> MEU(SOC) the

capability to conduct IO they could have initiated this capability on the ground once they were deployed in support of KFOR.

## CHAPTER THREE

*"If the aim of maneuver warfare is to shatter the cohesion of the enemy system, the immediate object toward that end is to create a situation in which the enemy cannot function. The ultimate goal is panic and paralysis, an enemy who has lost the ability to resist."*<sup>29</sup>

### BACKGROUND

The only current doctrinal link to IO in the Corps is the draft copy of Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP 6-2) entitled *MAGTF Command and Control*. This document articulates how the Corps intends to utilize information technology to protect friendly capabilities while exploiting enemy vulnerabilities.<sup>30</sup> Offensive IO consists of computer network attack (CNA), Command & Control Warfare (C<sup>2</sup>W), electronic warfare (EW), psychological operations (PSYOP), military deception, physical destruction, and special information operations (SIO).

The Marine Corps does not possess the resident capability to perform PSYOPs. If assigned a mission that requires PSYOPs capabilities, the MEU must be augmented with PSYOP specialists from the Army's 9<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Group, Ft.

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<sup>29</sup> Headquarters, United States Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 1, *Warfighting*, (Washington, D.C.: United States Marine Corps, 1996),

<sup>30</sup> Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 6-2, *MAGTF Command and Control*, (Quantico, Virginia: United States Marine Corps, 2000), 197.

Bragg, N.C. Civil Affairs support resides in the 4<sup>th</sup> Civil Affairs Group (CAG), Marine Corps' Reserve (MARFORRES), in Washington, D.C. The CAG would be responsible for coordinating the support of PSYOP support to the MEU.

The Marine Corps subdivides EW into three components: electronic attack, electronic protection, and electronic warfare support. Electronic attack (EA) is, "that division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic, directed energy, or antiradiation weapons to attack personnel, facilities, or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing, or destroying enemy combat capability."<sup>31</sup> Electronic protection is, "that division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities, and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize, or destroy friendly combat capability."<sup>32</sup> Finally, electronic warfare support is, "that division of electronic warfare involving actions taken by, or under direct control of, an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate sources of intentional and unintentional radiated

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<sup>31</sup> MCWP 6-2, *MAGTF Command and Control*, (Quantico, Virginia: United States Marine Corps, 2000), 199.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition."<sup>33</sup>

The only resident force that is currently capable of providing this type of support to the MEU is the Radio Battalion (RadBn) detachment embarked with the MEU's CE. The mission of the radio battalion is to provide tactical signals intelligence (SIGINT), ground-based electronic attack, communications security (COMSEC) monitoring, and special intelligence (SI) communication support to the MAGTF. Specific tasks include;<sup>34</sup>

- Conduct tactical (SIGINT) support operations in support of any MAGTF operation, including intercept, radio direction finding (DF), recording, and analysis of communications and non-communications signals, and SIGINT processing analysis, production, and reporting.
- Conduct EA against enemy or other hostile communications.
- Conduct COMSEC monitoring and reporting on friendly force communications (otherwise known as 'Red Teaming').
- Provide SI communications support and cryptographic guard (personnel and terminal equipment) in support of MAGTF CEs and battalion operations.
- Provide SIGINT support units (SSUs) to MAGTFs that are task organized with designated SIGINT, EA, sensitive compartmented information (SCI) communications, and other

<sup>33</sup> MCWP 6-2, *MAGTF Command and Control*, (Quantico, Virginia: United States Marine Corps, 2000), 199. Note: For the purpose of this monograph, the author asserts that the intended use of IO, at the MEU(SOC) level, will have the capability to perform each of these functions.

<sup>34</sup> MCRP 5-12D, *Organization of Marine Corps Forces*, (Headquarters United States Marine Corps, 1998), 6-6 - 6-7.

capabilities. The SSU is assigned to a MEU(SOC)'s CE.

- Provide radio reconnaissance teams with specialized insertion and extraction capabilities (combat rubber raiding craft, fast rope, rappel, helocast, static line parachute) to provide specified SIGINT and EA support during advance force, preassault, or deep postassault operations.

## INFORMATION OPERATIONS WITHIN THE MEU(SOC)

The MEU's Radio Battalion (RadBn) detachment consists of a SIGINT support team (SST), a Mobile Electronic Warfare Support System (MEWSS) vehicle and crew, and a radio reconnaissance team (RRT).<sup>35</sup> Combined, this detachment augments the MEU's CE to conduct intelligence, counterintelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance operations.<sup>36</sup> With augmentation from an IO-trained force, the MEU commander's ability to conduct offensive IO enhances the MEU's capabilities for the combatant commander/CinC. This force, based on the SOC missions they are capable of performing, is eminently more relevant within this AO to conduct IO. In order to have this capability the Corps must field the force to accomplish offensive IO.

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<sup>35</sup> Capt. Nate A. Braden, USMC, "Marine Corps Signals Intelligence," *Marine Corps Gazette*, (April, 2000): 62-65.

<sup>36</sup> MCRP 5-12D, 6-4.

The Marine Corps is still developing the full realization of this new capability in terms of what it can produce and deliver. Major Gary Winterstein, USMC, is the Corps point of contact for Space & Information Operations Integration at the Strategy and Plans Division of PP&O. In this capacity, he drafted the point paper for the Corps' anticipated IO position for the forthcoming Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). This paper specifically addresses the four long-term goals that have emerged as a part of the Corps' IO strategy. The endstate/vision is that Marine operating forces are ready and capable of conducting expeditionary IO to enhance Naval, Joint, Combined, and Multinational activities across the full-spectrum of military operations.<sup>37</sup>

The goals stated by PP&O are:

- Development of Marines
- Oversight of Resources
- Integrated within Operations
- Defined through Processes

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<sup>37</sup> United States Marine Corps, Plans, Policies and Operations, Information Paper, *Quadrennial Defense Review Information Superiority Panel - Information Operations Task Force Response*, (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters Marine Corps, 2000), 2.

Recently, the Marine Corps have taken measures to develop a deployable force capable of providing the MEU commander with an offensive IO capability.<sup>38</sup>

#### PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION

In the summer of 1999, a board of Marine general officers authorized the SIGINT community to conduct Computer Network Exploitation (CNE), provide support (in the form of Red Teaming) to CND, but not to conduct CNA for a period of two years.<sup>39</sup> CNE is defined as, "intelligence collection operations that obtain information resident in files of threat automated information systems (AIS) and gain information about potential vulnerabilities, or access critical information resident within foreign AIS that could be used to the benefit of friendly operations."<sup>40</sup> CND is defined as, "actions taken to defend against unauthorized activity within DoD information systems and computer networks."<sup>41</sup> CNA defined as, "operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 1-3.

<sup>39</sup> Major Tracy Swope, USMC, interview by author, personal interview, The Pentagon, Washington D. C., 25 October 2000.

<sup>40</sup> Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, CJCS Instruction (Preliminary Draft), "Information Assurance Implementation (IA Defense in Depth and Computer Network Defense)," Joint Staff, (Washington, D.C., 2000), GL-11.



themselves."<sup>42</sup> Within the Marine Corps, Computer Network Operations (CNO) consists of Digital Network Operations (DNO) and Digital Network Exploitation (DNE). Currently there are no official definitions of CNO, DNO, or DNE.<sup>43</sup> The Joint community, in the process of developing these terms, has not yet released them in any official document.

In September 2000, the Marine Corps established Company L, under the control of Marine Support Battalion (MarSptBn). MarSptBn typically supports national/strategic assets, while 1<sup>st</sup> RadBn supports I and III MEFs, and 2<sup>nd</sup> RadBn supports II MEF.<sup>44</sup> These three units comprise the only organic SIGINT capability within the Marine Corps.

Company L is the Corps' attempt to provide DNO/DNE capabilities to the MEU. This is a result of several former MEU commander's requests that their RadBn detachment Marines be clearly identified, by military occupational

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<sup>41</sup> Ibid. Note: Authority to conduct CND currently resides in JTF-CND, a component of U.S. SPACECOM. This mission became effective on 01 October, 1999.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid. Note: Due to Title 10 restrictions, the Marine Corps is unable to conduct CNA. The only two government agencies capable of performing this function are the CIA and the NSA under the auspices of their Title 50 capabilities.

<sup>43</sup> The U.S. Navy is trying to mitigate the use of the term CNO as it applies to IO because this acronym is used to describe the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and they do not want a similar acronym to compete with their service chief.

<sup>44</sup> Note: Many aspects of Marine Support Battalion are classified and will not be discussed within the parameters of this monograph. I MEF is located at Camp Pendleton, California. II MEF is located at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina. III MEF is located at Camp Foster, Okinawa.

skill (MOS) identifier, to have the skill set capable of performing DNO.<sup>45</sup> The intended plan is twofold. First, Company L will train Marines to conduct DNO. Secondly, the two RadBns will establish IO Platoons (consisting of one officer, and seventeen Marines) that will incorporate the training provided by Company L, and deploy with the MEU in order to provide the MEU with the DNO capability.

In order to prepare Marines to conduct DNO, Company L has undertaken the training of Marines from three MOSs and converting them into a DNO MOS. The designator for this new MOS has not been established as of yet. The three MOSs providing the backbone to this new MOS are: 2651 - Special Communicator, 2621 - Signals Intercept and Morse Code Operator, and 2631 - Electronic Intercept Analyst. According to Major Swope, Commanding Officer, Company L, these new DNO Marines will be identified following a formal interview where they will be judged on their maturity level and computer proficiency/potential proficiency. Once selected and trained, these Marines will transfer to either 1<sup>st</sup> or 2<sup>nd</sup> Radio Battalion for assignment with an IO Platoon. Within this platoon, these new DNO Marines will be responsible to train other RadBn Marines in this new skill

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<sup>45</sup> Major Tracy Swope, USMC, interview by author, telephone interview, Suitland, Md., 02 November 2000.

set. Additionally, they will be eligible to deploy with the MEU. It is expected to take nearly three years for this capability to be fully functioning, however Company L is working to provide the MEUs with a partial capability now, thus allowing the MEU to begin conducting this capability in the near future.<sup>46</sup> At the same time that this new capability is being developed under Company L, the Marine Corps Combat Development Command's Doctrine Center is conducting the concept based requirements (CBR) process, a formal solutions development process to determine the following; doctrine, organization, training and education, equipment, and support and facilities required for this new MOS. Normally a new MOS would be identified at the conclusion of the CBR, but due to the Corps attempt to expedite this capability for the MEU commanders, there is a parallel planning and execution effort underway between MCCDC and MarSptBn.<sup>47</sup>

Marine planners from MarSptBn, PP&O, and MCCDC intend to meet in January 2001 to discuss who should lead this IO force within the MEU. One solution would be that the RadBn detachment officer in charge (OIC), traditionally a first

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<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

lieutenant, be designated as the IO Team Leader. This designation would enable him to maintain cognizance over the classified/compartmentalized information available to the RRT and SSU. This RadBn detachment OIC typically reports to both the MEU's Intelligence Officer (S-2) and Operations Officer (S-3). In his billet as the IO Team Leader, this Marine team leader would theoretically receive support from the S-2 and tasking from the S-3. The S-3 would ultimately be responsible for all IO planning, integration, and employment in the MEU. This would create the need for an IO operations planning team (OPT) comprised of the following personnel from the MEU and PHIBRON staffs: S-2/N-2, S-3/N-3, Public Affairs Officers, Staff Judge Advocates, Target Information Officer (TIO) (MEU staff only), IO Team Leader (RadBn Det OIC), and the Electronic Warfare Officer (PHIBRON staff only).<sup>48</sup> If the mission requires it, the MEU must have the inherent capability to request through their Sixth Fleet chain of command, via II MEF, that a Civil Affairs/PSYOP detachment deploy from the continental United States (CONUS) to support these IO

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<sup>47</sup> LtCol Kathleen Harrison, USMC, Branch Head, Command & Control Support Branch, Doctrine Division, MCCDC, interview by author, telephone interview, Quantico, VA, 03 November 2000.

<sup>48</sup> The authors recommended members of the IO OPT are based on the model in the *Joint Information Operations Planning Handbook (Preliminary Draft)*. Armed Forces Staff College, Information Warfare Division, *Joint Information Operations Planning Handbook [Preliminary Draft]*, (Virginia, Armed Forces Staff College, 1999), II-2.

efforts. The ability to effect this deployment would require close coordination between the MEF, 4<sup>th</sup> CAG, and the 9<sup>th</sup> PSYOP Group at Ft. Bragg, N.C. Both of these supporting detachments would need to be task organized to provide members to the IO OPT as well as provide tactical team members for the IO force.

### PSYOP & CIVIL AFFAIRS

The inclusion of these two capabilities into the MEU's planning and execution capabilities further enhances their successful ability to conduct IO. There is, however, a difficulty in obtaining these resources. First, a PSYOP support element does not reside within the Marine Corps; therefore, it will be necessary to request this support from the Special Operations Command. Specifically, the approval for this support is very complex. There are two approval processes; one in time of war/conflict, and the other in time of peace. Based on the assumption that the MEU would not need this support unless it foresaw the potential for conflict, this paper will address the former approval process.

If required, the MEU would initiate the request for PSYOP support to the commander Sixth Fleet, who would forward this request via CinCUSNavEur, to CINC EUCOM. The

approval and dissemination of all PSYOP in theater is coordinated with the unified command J-3 and remains the responsibility of the CINC.<sup>49</sup> Once requested, and if approved, this support would deploy from Fort Bragg, N.C. The type unit to support a MEU would be a Brigade PSYOP Support Element (BPSE), or elements thereof task organized to support the specific needs of the MEU.

PSYOP support to contingency operations, per FM 3-30 *Psychological Operations*, include the following:

- Disaster Relief
- Demonstrations and show-of-force operations
- Noncombatant evacuation operations
- Attacks and raids
- Freedom of navigation and protection of shipping
- Operations to restore order
- Security assistance surges
- Military support to counterdrug operations<sup>50</sup>

With the exception of the last item, these activities augment the MEU(SOC) missions listed in Chapter 2.

Second, Marine Civil Affairs (CA) forces are task-organized to reinforce a MAGTF CE with "specially trained and organized personnel in order to assist the commander in the planning, coordination and execution of [Civil Military

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<sup>49</sup> Headquarters, Department of the Army/United States Marine Corps, Field Manual FM 33-1/FMFM 3-53, *Psychological Operations*, (Washington D.C.: United States Army/United States Marine Corps, 1993), C-2 - C-3. Note: The MEU commander may request mission-specific PSYOP support, however, the CINC or a designated JTF commander direct the priority of PSYOP support.

Operations] CMO and tactical PSYOP in support of the MAGTF mission."<sup>51</sup> The Command and Control Support Branch, Doctrine Division, MCCDC, are determining the intended usage of CA forces at this time. They are developing a MCWP that will articulate to the Marine Corps how CA forces will support the MAGTF. This publication, currently in draft form, identifies two types of support; preplanned and contingency.<sup>52</sup>

Preplanned support is seen as, "predeployment exercises, such as the MEU(SOC) workups, are authorized for support. Supporting CA elements conduct staff integration and exercise the Marine Corps Planning Process with MAGTFs they will support during contingencies. These dedicated CA forces might then schedule limited deployments overseas for important training events. At their best, these preplanned exercises and operations serve as rehearsals that facilitate contingency support."<sup>53</sup>

Contingency support is, "to provide immediate support to the MAGTFs engaged in contingency operations, generally within less than 72 hours...Ideally, at least the CA Team

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<sup>50</sup> Ibid., 3-30.

<sup>51</sup> Headquarters, United States Marine Corps, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33 (DRAFT), *MAGTF Civil Military Operations*, (Washington D.C.: United States Marine Corps, 2000), 39.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid., 40-41.

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 40.

Commander has exercised with the MAGTF which requests reinforcement."<sup>54</sup>

The unit designated to support the MEU is the CA Team. This size unit provides the MEU the capability to plan, coordinate and conduct Civil Military Operations (CMO), yet it cannot support the full range of Marine functional specialties. These functional specialties are; Dislocated Civilians, Cultural Relations, Public Safety, Civilian Supply, Civil Information, Legal, and Public Health.<sup>55</sup> It is intended that the CA Team will be task organized for the MEU to perform those functional specialties that the MEU commander has designated most relevant to his unit prior to their deployment. This implies that the MEU staff conducts an intelligence estimate on the Mediterranean region before their deployment, with input from the NSA and other regional intelligence sources.

The Marine Corps must efficiently utilize these capabilities by incorporating them into the MEU(SOC) training schedule. This will force the MEU staff, principally the S-3, to develop the mission essential tasks of the IO Team, and the planning factors for the OPT. Ultimately, these offensive IO capabilities will need to be

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<sup>54</sup> Ibid., 40-41.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid., 37-38.



evaluated during the SOCEX - the final evaluation of the MEU's readiness before deployment to the Mediterranean.

## CHAPTER 4

*"It will not be as easy to apply existing international law principles to information attack, a term used to describe the use of electronic means to gain access to or change information in a targeted information system without necessarily damaging its physical components. One of the principle forms of information attack is likely to be computer network attack, or in today's vernacular, the 'hacking' of another nations' computer systems."*<sup>56</sup>

The previous chapters have captured a 'snapshot in time' of the Marine Corps' current posture concerning IO in support of the MEU. This capability, though probably not fully realized for it's full potential, will be refined over the course of the next several years as MEU commanders and their staffs expand the limits of its capabilities, thus providing the CINC the ability to utilize the MEU in new and exciting ways. The limitations to this potential, from purely a technological end, will not be addressed in this paper due to security reasons. The other outstanding limitation worth mentioning though is that of the legal concerns surrounding the realm of IO. Throughout the research of this topic, one constant presented itself throughout - the fact that our laws are a product of an Industrial Age and our current capabilities, in the realm of IO, are in large measure due to the benefits of the

Information Age. The result of these two converging ages is that our technological capabilities have outpaced what is allowable by military forces under the Law of Armed Conflict.

## LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF IO

"If the deliberate actions of one belligerent cause injury, death, damage, and destruction to the military forces, citizens, and property of the other belligerent, those actions are likely to be judged by applying traditional law of war principles."<sup>57</sup> This quote typifies the new challenges that forces utilizing offensive IO will face because the injury, death, damage and destruction could be by non-kinetic means.<sup>58</sup> Yet, U.S. military forces are constrained by the laws set forth under Title 10, U.S. Code. Both Title 10 and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) Standing Rules of Engagement (SROE) are quite nebulous in defining military capabilities now capable within the realm of IO. Neither of these two documents specifically addresses the challenges that our operational commanders

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<sup>56</sup> Phillip A. Johnson, "New Legal Challenges Presented by Information Operations," *An Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information Warfare* (May, 1999) 5.

<sup>57</sup> Department of Defense, Office of General Counsel, "An assessment of International Legal Issues in Information Operations," (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 1999), 8.

<sup>58</sup> James F. Dunnigan describes these "non-kinetic weapons" in the book, *Digital Soldiers*. The explanation of these weapons is not the intent of this paper, but their reference is necessary in order to describe their potential use by an IO force.

will face when weighing the use of applying an IO force (e.g., disrupting an adversary's rail network as described in the introductory vignette) against our current laws. Therefore, it is necessary for the Law of Armed Conflict, seen as the arbitrator of legal matters for military forces, to update how we define the application of force when weapons and equipment, indicative of an IO force, are used in lieu of traditional weapons. For example, a government agency must obtain a court order in order to gain unauthorized access into a computer in the U.S. The Justice Department has extended this law to computers outside of CONUS as well.<sup>59</sup> Therefore, if the MEU were to employ its IO force to "hack" into an adversary's computer in order to disrupt or deny an adversary's decision-making abilities, it would need to request a court order from the office of the Attorney General. This is unrealistic for the commander.

In the meantime, the SIGINT (and PSYOP) community use the guidance set forth in Executive Order (EO) 12333. Specifically, the National Security Agency, under the

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<sup>59</sup> Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities [database on-line] (Washington, D.C., 1981, accessed 14 November 2000); available from <http://www.tscm.com/EO12333.html>; Internet.

authorization of the Secretary of Defense, is responsible for the following IO-related activities:<sup>60</sup>

- Control of signals intelligence collection and processing activities, including assignment of resources to an appropriate agent for such periods and tasks as required for the direct support of military commanders;
- Collection of signals intelligence information for national foreign intelligence purposes in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence;
- Processing of signals intelligence data for national foreign intelligence purposes in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence;
- Dissemination of signals intelligence information for national foreign intelligence purposes to authorized elements of the Government, including the military services, in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence;
- Collection, processing and dissemination of signals intelligence information for counterintelligence purposes;
- Provision of signals intelligence support for the conduct of military operations in accordance with tasking, priorities, and standards of timeliness assigned by the Secretary of Defense. If provision of such support requires use of national collection systems, these systems will be tasked within existing guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence.

These six items illustrate the specific areas that the MEU's RadBn detachment would be able to operate from within the legal guidelines set forth by the White House.

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid.

Therefore, the time is at hand for the Marine Corps to clearly articulate how it intends to use offensive IO. Once identified, it must seek amendments to the current laws in order to leverage the associated technology against the capability it can provide.

## SUMMARY


Marines regard the use of IO as a capability provided to the MAGTF commander in the accomplishment of his mission. As articulated in Major Winterstein's point paper, "all Marine Operating Force elements are IO forces."<sup>61</sup> This organizational mindset demonstrates the Corps' belief that no one particular organization should exist to accomplish an IO-related mission. However, it is unrealistic in the sense that there have to be planners, organizers, and executors of an IO mission. Thus, there are three outstanding issues for the Marine Corps to challenge itself in accomplishing in the very near future. First, Marines must understand their role concerning IO. This will occur when the doctrine articulates how the MAGTF will employ IO. Secondly, the MEU must integrate this capability into its predeployment training program and convey this capability to the regional CINC it supports.

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<sup>61</sup> United States Marine Corps, Plans, Policies and Operations, Information Paper, *Quadrennial Defense Review Information Superiority*

Once deployed to the Mediterranean, the MEU must continue their training with other U.S. regional forces that it could conceivably support in a JTF mission. This IO training would allow MEU planners the ability to fully realize the capability their IO force could provide. Lastly, the Marine Corps must articulate the capability that their IO forces can provide, with the technology used to support them, and then convey the shortfall that exists due to current legal restrictions. Once identified, amendments to these laws are requested in order to update our existing laws with our current capabilities.


APPENDIX A



Source: Marine Corps Reference Publication 5-12D



APPENDIX B



## GLOSSARY

ACE	Aviation Combat Element
AFSouth	Allied Forces South
AIS	Automated Information Systems
AO	Area of Operations
AOR	Area of Responsibility
ARG	Amphibious Ready Group
BiH	Bosnia-Herzegovina
BOS	Battlefield Operating System
BPSE	Brigade PSYOP Support Element
BSSG	Brigade Service Support Group
CA	Civil Affairs
CAG	Civil Affairs Group
C <sup>2</sup> W	Command & Control Warfare
CAT	Crisis Action Team
CBR	Concept Based Requirement
CE	Command Element
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CINC	Commander-in-Chief

CinCUSNavEur	Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Naval Forces Europe
CMO	Civil Military Operations
CNA	Computer Network Attack
CND	Computer Network Defense
CNE	Computer Network Exploitation
CNO	Computer Network Operations
C <sup>2</sup>	Command & Control
C <sup>3</sup>	Command, Control, & Communications
COMSEC	Communications Security
CONUS	Continental United States
CSS	Combat Service Support
CSSE	Combat Service Support Element
DIA	Defense Intelligence Activity
DNE	Digital Network Exploitation
DNO	Digital Network Operations
DoD	Department of Defense
EA	Electronic Attack
EO	Executive Order
EUCOM	European Command

EW	Electronic Warfare
GCE	Ground Combat Element
IO	Information Operations
IOTF	Information Operations Task Force
JTF	Joint Task Force
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
MAGTF	Marine Air-Ground Task Force
MARFORRES	Marine Forces Reserve
MCCDC	Marine Corps Combat Development Command
MCWP	Marine Corps Warfighting Publication
MEB	Marine Expeditionary Brigade
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
METL	Mission Essential Task List
MEU	Marine Expeditionary Unit
MEWSS	Mobile Electronic Warfare Support System
MOS	Military Occupational Skill
MSSG	MEU Service Support Group
NAVFOREUR	Naval Forces Europe

NCA	National Command Authority
NMS	National Military Strategy
NSA	National Security Agency
OIC	Officer in Charge
OMFTS	Operational Maneuver from the Sea
OPT	Operational Planning Team
PAO	Public Affairs Office
PHIBLEX	Amphibious Landing Exercise
PP&O	Plans, Policy and Operations
PSYOP	Psychological Operations
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review
RadBn	Radio Battalion
RRT	Radio Reconnaissance Team
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SFOR	Stabilization Force
SI	Special Intelligence
SIO	Special Information Operations
SOC	Special Operations Capable
SOCEX	Special Operations Capable Exercise

SOTG	Special Operations Training Group
SPMAGTF	Special Purpose MAGTF
SROE	Special Rules of Engagement
SST	SIGINT Support Team
SSU	SIGINT Support Unit
STOM	Ship-to-Objective Maneuver
StrikForSouth	Strike Forces South
TIO	Target Information Officer
USMC	United States Marine Corps

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